tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post3609235951895521067..comments2024-03-23T04:01:39.348-04:00Comments on Understanding Society: Guest post by Guus DuindamDan Littlehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15953897221283103880noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-40765647686361574232019-11-11T09:18:44.769-05:002019-11-11T09:18:44.769-05:00Bhaskar was well known for a somewhat convoluted s...Bhaskar was well known for a somewhat convoluted style of prose and, on occasions, this has led to his work being misinterpreted. This seems to have happened in this case when Duindam deals with the notions of ordered experience in ‘open’ and ‘closed’ systems; in particular in the passage when he states: <br />"And to presuppose that there are such things as knowable universal laws of nature –operative in closed and open causal systems alike – just is to presuppose that’ll experience is ordered. The ordered nature of experience is, therefore, a necessary presupposition for experimentation." <br /><br />Bhaskar would have agreed that “the ordered nature of experience is a necessary presupposition for experimentation”, but would have disputed the claim that he is relying on this notion in distinguishing between open and closed systems. The distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ systems is not one based on the fact that experience itself is ordered, but that the order in which phenomena are experienced is different in open and closed systems. <br /><br />This means that, in a closed laboratory system, an event B always follows an event A. The same does not always happen in an open system where A might occur followed by either event B, C, D or even E. This does not mean that the experience of A followed by either B, C, D or E is not an ordered one. In fact, such experiences have to be ordered if the application of the knowledge gained in the laboratory is to be meaningful. They also have to be ordered in order for the attempt, in a laboratory, to isolate which of events B, C, D or E is the significant one in identifying the mechanism at work in the structure found in event A. <br /><br />Since the ‘failure’ of Bhaskar’s argument is predicated on a misinterpretation of the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ systems, one cannot conclude that Duindam has demonstrated that Bhaskar’s argument has failed.<br />Francis Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07654506775994070076noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-75849653045061730352019-11-04T05:07:54.356-05:002019-11-04T05:07:54.356-05:00PPS I am not sure whether the last submission got ...PPS I am not sure whether the last submission got through to you. I noticed that the submission does not allow for formatting, so have added quotation marks.<br /><br />This is a very interesting article giving a comprehensive overview of Roy Bhaskar’s argument in A Realist Theory of Science (RTS).<br />Before commenting on it, as I am now retired and do not have a website, let me declare an interest. In 1974-6 Roy Bhaskar was my tutor for an undergraduate honours MA in Philosophy at Edinburgh University and subsequently as a supervised post-graduate (76-78) – although I was supervised by Ronald Hepburn, Barry Barnes and Stuart Brown for the doctoral thesis. I also helped Roy compile the subject index for the second edition of RTS, so have an in-depth knowledge of what he was trying to achieve.<br />Roy’s style of prose was somewhat convoluted and, on occasions, has led to his work being misinterpreted. I believe this has happened in Guus Duindam’s post when he deals with the notions of ordered experience in open and closed systems.<br /><br />And to presuppose that there are such things as knowable universal laws of nature – operative in closed and open causal systems alike – just is to presuppose that all experience is ordered. The ordered nature of experience is, therefore, a necessary presupposition for experimentation.<br /><br />Roy would have agreed that “the ordered nature of experience is a necessary presupposition for experimentation”, but would have disputed the claim that he is relying on this notion in distinguishing between 'open' and 'closed' systems. The distinction between open and closed systems is not one based on the fact that experience itself is ordered, but that the order in which phenomena are experienced is different in open and closed systems. This means that, in a closed laboratory system, an event B always follows an event A. The same does not always happen in an open system where A might occur followed by either event B, C, D or even E. This does not mean that the experience of A followed by either C, D or E is not an ordered one; in fact it has to be ordered in order for the application of the knowledge gained in the laboratory to be meaningful. It also has to be ordered in order for the attempt to isolate which of events B, C, D or E is the significant one in identifying the mechanism at work in the structure found in event A. In contrast with Roy, I would prefer to say ‘real object’ rather than ‘structure’.<br /><br />I would add that one of the psychological difficulties involved in accepting Roy’s argument in A RTS is lack of generalisation to all cultural systems, including those such as the Athenian Republic of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle – where laboratory experimentation was not as formalised as it is now. We would want to say that especially Aristotle could show that real substances existed and had causal powers which operated independently of any conceptualisation of them. I believe that a more generalised transcendental argument than the one Roy developed can be constructed to show that the distinction between the Bhaskarian transitive and intransitive dimensions holds in all cultural systems. But this involves more space than is justifiable in the answer to the post in a blog.<br />Francis Roberts<br />Francis Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07654506775994070076noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-88575893743431976672019-11-04T04:51:45.193-05:002019-11-04T04:51:45.193-05:00PSI have amended and corrected elements of the com...PSI have amended and corrected elements of the comment I left here yesterday.<br /><br /><br />This is a very interesting article giving a comprehensive overview of Roy Bhaskar’s argument in A Realist Theory of Science (RTS).<br />Before commenting on it, as I am now retired and do not have a website, let me declare an interest. In 1974-6 Roy Bhaskar was my tutor for an undergraduate honours MA in Philosophy at Edinburgh University and subsequently as a supervised post-graduate (76-78) – although I was supervised by Ronald Hepburn, Barry Barnes and Stuart Brown for the doctoral thesis. I also helped Roy compile the subject index for the second edition of RTS, so have an in-depth knowledge of what he was trying to achieve.<br />Roy’s style of prose was somewhat convoluted and, on occasions, has led to his work being misinterpreted. I believe this has happened in Guus Duindam’s post when he deals with the notions of ordered experience open and closed systems.<br /><br />And to presuppose that there are such things as knowable universal laws of nature – operative in closed and open causal systems alike – just is to presuppose that all experience is ordered. The ordered nature of experience is, therefore, a necessary presupposition for experimentation.<br /><br />Roy would have agreed that “the ordered nature of experience is a necessary presupposition for experimentation”, but would have disputed the claim that he is relying on this notion. The distinction between open and closed systems is not one based on the fact that experience itself is ordered, but that the order in which phenomena are experienced is different in open and closed systems. This means that, in a closed laboratory system, an event B always follows an event A. The same does not always happen in an open system where A might occur followed by either event B, C, D or even E. This does not mean that the experience of A followed by either C, D or E is not an ordered one; in fact it has to be ordered in order for the application of the knowledge gained in the laboratory to be meaningful. It also has to be ordered in order for the attempt to isolate which of events B, C, D or E is the significant one in identifying the mechanism at work in the structure found in event A. In contrast with Roy, I would prefer to say ‘real object’ rather than ‘structure’.<br /><br />I would add that one of the psychological difficulties involved in accepting Roy’s argument in A RTS is lack of generalisation to all cultural systems, including those such as the Athenian Republic of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle – where laboratory experimentation was not as formalised as it is now. We would want to say that especially Aristotle could show that real substances existed and had causal powers which operated independently of any conceptualisation of them. I believe that a more generalised transcendental argument than the one Roy developed can be constructed to show that the distinction between the Bhaskarian transitive and intransitive dimensions holds in all cultural systems. But this involves more space than is justifiable in the answer to the post in a blog.<br />Francis Robertsnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-15621295807040082832019-11-03T10:19:15.065-05:002019-11-03T10:19:15.065-05:00This is a very interesting article giving a compre...This is a very interesting article giving a comprehensive overview of Roy Bhaskar’s argument in A realist Theory of Science (RTS ).<br />Before commenting on it, as I am now retired and do not have a website, let me declare an interest. In 1974-6 Roy Bhaskar was my tutor for an undergraduate honours MA in Philosophy at Edinburgh University and subsequently as a supervised post-graduate (76-78) – although I was supervised by Ronald Hepburn, Barry Barnes and Stuart Brown for my doctoral thesis. I also helped Roy compile the subject index for A RTS, so have an in-depth knowledge of what he was trying to achieve.<br />Roy’s style of prose was somewhat convoluted and, on occasions, has led to his work being misinterpreted. I believe this has happened in Guus Duindam’s post when he deals with the notions of ordered experience open and closed systems.<br /><br />And to presuppose that there are such things as knowable universal laws of nature – operative in closed and open causal systems alike – just is to presuppose that all experience is ordered. The ordered nature of experience is, therefore, a necessary presupposition for experimentation.<br /><br />Roy would have agreed that “the ordered nature of experience is a necessary presupposition for experimentation”, but would have disputed the claim that he is relying on this notion. The distinction between open and closed systems is not one based on the fact that experience itself is ordered, but that the order in which phenomena are experienced is different in open and closed systems. This means that, in a closed laboratory system, an event B always follows an event A, the same does not always happen in an open system where A might occur followed by event C rather than B. This does not mean that the experience of C is not an ordered one; in fact it has to be ordered in order for the application of the knowledge gained in the laboratory to be meaningful. <br /><br />I would add that one of the psychological difficulties involved in accepting Roy’s argument in A RTS is lack of generalisation to all cultural systems, including those such as the Athenian Republic of Socrates Plato and Aristotle – where laboratory experimentation was not as formalised as it is now. We would want to say that especially Aristotle could show that real substances existed and had causal powers which operated independently of any conceptualisation of them. I believe that a more generalised transcendental argument than the one Roy developed can be constructed to show that the distinction between the Bhaskarian transitive and intransitive dimensions holds in all cultural systems. But this involves more space than is justifiable in the answer to the post in a blog.Francis Robertsnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-32323826067060109232019-11-03T10:18:00.806-05:002019-11-03T10:18:00.806-05:00This is a very interesting article giving a compre...This is a very interesting article giving a comprehensive overview of Roy Bhaskar’s argument in A realist Theory of Science (RTS ).<br />Before commenting on it, as I am now retired and do not have a website, let me declare an interest. In 1974-6 Roy Bhaskar was my tutor for an undergraduate honours MA in Philosophy at Edinburgh University and subsequently as a supervised post-graduate (76-78) – although I was supervised by Ronald Hepburn, Barry Barnes and Stuart Brown for my doctoral thesis. I also helped Roy compile the subject index for A RTS, so have an in-depth knowledge of what he was trying to achieve.<br />Roy’s style of prose was somewhat convoluted and, on occasions, has led to his work being misinterpreted. I believe this has happened in Guus Duindam’s post when he deals with the notions of ordered experience open and closed systems.<br /><br />And to presuppose that there are such things as knowable universal laws of nature – operative in closed and open causal systems alike – just is to presuppose that all experience is ordered. The ordered nature of experience is, therefore, a necessary presupposition for experimentation.<br /><br />Roy would have agreed that “the ordered nature of experience is a necessary presupposition for experimentation”, but would have disputed the claim that he is relying on this notion. The distinction between open and closed systems is not one based on the fact that experience itself is ordered, but that the order in which phenomena are experienced is different in open and closed systems. This means that, in a closed laboratory system, an event B always follows an event A, the same does not always happen in an open system where A might occur followed by event C rather than B. This does not mean that the experience of C is not an ordered one; in fact it has to be ordered in order for the application of the knowledge gained in the laboratory to be meaningful. <br /><br />I would add that one of the psychological difficulties involved in accepting Roy’s argument in A RTS is lack of generalisation to all cultural systems, including those such as the Athenian Republic of Socrates Plato and Aristotle – where laboratory experimentation was not as formalised as it is now. We would want to say that especially Aristotle could show that real substances existed and had causal powers which operated independently of any conceptualisation of them. I believe that a more generalised transcendental argument than the one Roy developed can be constructed to show that the distinction between the Bhaskarian transitive and intransitive dimensions holds in all cultural systems. But this involves more space than is justifiable in the answer to the post in a blog.<br />Francis Robertsnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-74900400456385170662017-07-29T18:06:09.164-04:002017-07-29T18:06:09.164-04:00Great article! I need to re-read this.
Great article! I need to re-read this.<br />Michael Licitranoreply@blogger.com