tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post3630208188251643986..comments2024-03-23T04:01:39.348-04:00Comments on Understanding Society: Dissecting the socialDan Littlehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15953897221283103880noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-87946153054392296942011-06-09T23:57:14.105-04:002011-06-09T23:57:14.105-04:00In your 2 posts on analytical sociology and mechan...In your 2 posts on analytical sociology and mechanisms, you highlight the opposition between the mechanism approach and a relational view of society. You also emphasize the dependence of mechanism thinking on rational choice theory. But what about the work of Charles Tilly? Tilly championed mechanisms while promoting a relational view of social reality, and he also criticized rational choice theory.<br /><br />As someone new to this line of thinking (which I find very attractive), I am trying to understand out how Tilly fits with Hedtsrom and the analytical sociologists. Ultimately I am interested in figuring out how to apply the mechanism approach to archaeological research.Michael E. Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03942595266312225661noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-85876104765019099222011-06-09T16:37:27.542-04:002011-06-09T16:37:27.542-04:00Daniel,
thanks for your replies. It is fun to dis...Daniel,<br /><br />thanks for your replies. It is fun to discuss these issues, but I think we might go on forever, so think I will stop for now.<br /><br />Just one last observation, our exchange on social explanation and methodology ended up in one on social ontology (the realm of intuition and political preferences) - as is often the case especially in the social sciences. Why?<br /><br />Best Wishes,<br />Jeroen.Jeroennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-1342817558005231962011-06-09T15:59:57.517-04:002011-06-09T15:59:57.517-04:00Jeroen,
Again, very good and probing questions. ...Jeroen,<br /><br />Again, very good and probing questions. Thanks.<br /><br />Here is my reason for endorsing the microfoundations requirement: social entities are constituted by individuals situated in social relationships and developed through concrete social experiences. There is no other possible substrate for a social entity. Therefore the causal powers of a social entity must depend upon features of the (typical) actors and actions that make it up. This might be directly reducible; or it might be a supervenience relation. But the discipline of the microfoundations dictum is simply that we need to be able to identify (at some level of description) what those underlying actions, dispositions, and actors might be. Otherwise we have spooky holism.<br /><br />My point about Bhaskar and Hedstrom re realism: I agree with you that they disagree about the nature of the sorts of social things that exist; Hedstrom sees social wholes as composites that are determined by the individual-level substrate; whereas Bhaskar is open to some kind of structuralism/holism. So their social ontologies differ. What they agree about is how we should interpret social entity statements. For example, consider "class power causes economic inequality." Bhaskar may think that class power is real in that it exists independently from individuals, whereas Hedstrom thinks class power exists insofar as there are recurring structures of individual activity that create class advantages. But both agree that "class power" exists. I don't see this as a logical inconsistency, but rather a substantive difference about social ontology. You may think that "colors" exist independently from perceivers; I may think that "color" supervenes upon physical properties of objects and the detailed structure of the neuro-anatomy of the perceiver. But we both think that "color" exists. And it is entirely open to Hedstrom to agree that "class power" has causal powers; but he needs to insist that these powers derive from the features of the micro-phenomena of class.Dan Littlehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15953897221283103880noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-20253416354776167922011-06-09T14:15:49.677-04:002011-06-09T14:15:49.677-04:00Daniel, thanks for your reply.
I would be interes...Daniel, thanks for your reply.<br /><br />I would be interested in learning more about "It's a further assumption, that I also want to endorse,". Fair enough that you want to endorse it. But why? Aren't we losing interesting explanatory information on the social level by introducing this condition of micro-foundations? Furthermore, the classic comment: you can make this kind of requirements all the way down to the physical level? <br /><br />Secondly, I do agree on how you use Bhaskar in relation to Hedstrom in your first post, but confusion is all around. What about your sentence in your reply: "Both Hedstrom and Bhaskar agree that a reference to a social mechanism is intended to be interpreted as a statement about real social things." Hedstrom and Bhaskar could easily interpret *social mechanism* very differently here - for Bhaskar there are mechanisms on the social, macro-level with causal capacities, something Hedstrom does not accept at all. Secondly, *real social things* for Bhaskar are entities with causal capacities, while for Hedstrom this are entities (are they for him?) without causal capacity/agency. So, saying *Both Hedstrom and Bhaskar*, what shall we call it, recuperation ;-)?Jeroennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-26578630130033398132011-06-09T13:42:38.644-04:002011-06-09T13:42:38.644-04:00Excellent post, very clear and helpful to those of...Excellent post, very clear and helpful to those of us trying to understand/explain the mechanics underlying the linkages between the social and the individual!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00264850364535727470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-56038462382372728392011-06-09T12:40:14.452-04:002011-06-09T12:40:14.452-04:00Jeroen,
Great comments -- thanks. I think the re...Jeroen,<br /><br />Great comments -- thanks. I think the relation to Bhaskar is simply the "realism of social processes" point. You're right that Bhaskar rejects the individualism part of AS, and would give causal legitimacy to structural features; whereas AS would say something more like this: structural features are "real"; but they require microfoundations. But the two positions are united in opposition to an instrumentalism that says that theories are just ways of conveniently summarizing empirical regularities. Both Hedstrom and Bhaskar agree that a reference to a social mechanism is intended to be interpreted as a statement about real social things.<br /><br />I think I do want to endorse the point that a valid explanation depends on having an account of causal mechanisms linking something to the event or regularity to be explained; so explanation requires mechanism. It's a further assumption, that I also want to endorse, that the mechanisms identified in social explanations need to have microfoundations at a more individual-actor level. In other words: there are no macro-macro causal mechanisms that fail to have microfoundations.Dan Littlehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15953897221283103880noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4058766287077382431.post-62782645582341471962011-06-09T12:22:57.359-04:002011-06-09T12:22:57.359-04:00Thanks for this Daniel. Do have a couple of questi...Thanks for this Daniel. Do have a couple of questions, though?<br /><br />-First, wouldn't Bhaskar find explanations on the social level (the deck of Coleman's boat) acceptable? I do think so, so associating him with Hedström seems confusing.<br /><br />-Secondly, I think there might be some confusion between providing an explanation and confirming a causal relation. For the latter you might require lower-level mechanisms, for the former I do not see any convincing philosophical arguments. You?Jeroenhttp://logica.ugent.be/jeroennoreply@blogger.com