Monday, September 30, 2019

The functionality of artifacts


We think of artifacts as being "functional" in a specific sense: their characteristics are well designed and adjusted for their "intended" use. Sometimes this is because of the explicit design process through which they were created, and sometimes it is the result of a long period of small adjustments by artisan-producers and users who recognize a potential improvement in shape, material, or internal workings that would lead to superior performance. Jon Elster described these processes in his groundbreaking 1983 book, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science.

Here is how I described the gradual process of refinement of technical practice with respect to artisanal winegrowing in a 2009 post (link):
First, consider the social reality of a practice like wine-making. Pre-modern artisanal wine makers possess an ensemble of techniques through which they grow grapes and transform them into wine. These ensembles are complex and developed; different wine "traditions" handle the tasks of cultivation and fermentation differently, and the results are different as well (fine and ordinary burgundies, the sweet gewurztraminers of Alsace versus Germany). The novice artisan doesn't reinvent the art of winemaking; instead, he/she learns the techniques and traditions of the elders. But at the same time, the artisan wine maker may also introduce innovations into his/her practice -- a wrinkle in the cultivation techniques, a different timing in the fermentation process, the introduction of a novel ingredient into the mix.
Over time the art of grape cultivation and wine fermentation improves.

But in a way this expectation of "artifact functionality" is too simple and direct. In the development of a technology or technical practice there are multiple actors who are in a position to influence the development of the outcome, and they often have divergent interests. These differences of interests may lead to substantial differences in performance for the technology or technique. Technologies reflect social interests, and this is as evident in the history of technology as it is in the current world of high tech. In the winemaking case, for example, landlords may have interests that favor dense planting, whereas the wine maker may favor more sparse planting because of the superior taste this pattern creates in the grape. More generally, the owner's interest in sales and profitability exerts a pressure on the characteristics of the product that run contrary to the interest of the artisan-producer who gives primacy to the quality of the product, and both may have interests that are somewhat inconsistent with the broader social good.

Imagine the situation that would result if a grain harvesting machine were continually redesigned by the profit-seeking landowner and the agricultural workers. Innovations that are favorable to enhancing profits may be harmful for safety and welfare of agricultural workers, and vice versa. So we might imagine a see-saw of technological development, as the landowner and the worker gains more influence over the development of the technology.

As an undergraduate at the University of Illinois in the late 1960s I heard the radical political scientist Michael Parenti tell just such a story about his father's struggle to maintain artisanal quality in the Italian bread he baked in New York City in the 1950s. Here is an online version of the story (link). Michael Parenti's story begins like this:
Years ago, my father drove a delivery truck for the Italian bakery owned by his uncle Torino. When Zi Torino returned to Italy in 1956, my father took over the entire business. The bread he made was the same bread that had been made in Gravina, Italy, for generations. After a whole day standing, it was fresh as ever, the crust having grown hard and crisp while the inside remained soft, solid, and moist. People used to say that our bread was a meal in itself.... 
Pressure from low-cost commercial bread companies forced his father into more and more cost-saving adulteration of the bread. And the story ends badly ...
But no matter what he did, things became more difficult. Some of our old family customers complained about the change in the quality of the bread and began to drop their accounts. And a couple of the big stores decided it was more profitable to carry the commercial brands. 
Not long after, my father disbanded the bakery and went to work driving a cab for one of the big taxi fleets in New York City. In all the years that followed, he never mentioned the bread business again.
Parenti's message to activist students in the 1960s was stark: this is the logic of capitalism at work.

Of course market pressures do not always lead to the eventual ruin of the products we buy; there is also an economic incentive created by consumers who favor higher performance and more features that leads businesses to improve their products. So the dynamic that ruined Michael Parenti's father's bread is only one direction that market competition can take. The crucial point is this: there is nothing in the development of technology and technique that guarantees outcomes that are more and more favorable for the public.

Sunday, September 29, 2019

Flood plains and land use


An increasingly pressing consequence of climate change is the rising threat of flood in coastal and riverine communities. And yet a combination of Federal and local policies have created land use incentives that have led to increasing development in flood plains since the major floods of the 1990s and 2000s (Mississippi River 1993, Hurricane Katrina 2005, Hurricane Sandy 2016, ...), with the result that economic losses from flooding have risen sharply. Many of those costs are born by tax payers through Federal disaster relief and subsidies to the Federal flood insurance program.

Christine Klein and Sandra Zellmer provide a highly detailed and useful review of these issues in their brilliant SMU Law Review article, "Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters" (link). These arguments are developed more fully in their 2014 book Mississippi River Tragedies: A Century of Unnatural Disaster. Klein and Zellmer believe that current flood insurance policies and disaster assistance policies at the federal level continue to support perverse incentives for developers and homeowners and need to be changed. Projects and development within 100-year flood plains need to be subject to mandatory flood insurance coverage; flood insurance policies should be rated by degree of risk; and government units should have the legal ability to prohibit development in flood plains. Here are their central recommendations for future Federal policy reform:
Substantive requirements for watershed planning and management would effectuate the Progressive Era objective underlying the original Flood Control Act of 1928: treating the river and its floodplain as an integrated unit from source to mouth, "systematically and consistently," with coordination of navigation, flood control, irrigation, hydropower, and ecosystem services. To accomplish this objective, the proposed organic act must embrace five basic principles:
(1) Adopt sustainable, ecologically resilient standards and objectives;
(2) Employ comprehensive environmental analysis of individual and cumulative effects of floodplain construction (including wetlands fill); (3) Enhance federal leadership and competency by providing the Corps with primary responsibility for flood control measures, cabined by clear standards, continuing monitoring responsibilities, and oversight through probing judicial review, and supported by a secure, non-partisan funding source; (4) Stop wetlands losses and restore damaged floodplains by re-establishing natural areas that are essential for floodwater retention; and (5) Recognize that land and water policies are inextricably linked and plan for both open space and appropriate land use in the floodplain. (1535-36)
Here is Klein and Zellmer's description of the US government's response to flood catastrophes in the 1920s:
Flood control was the most pressing issue before the Seventieth Congress, which sat from 1927 to 1929. Congressional members quickly recognized that the problems were two-fold. First, Congressman Edward Denison of Illinois criticized the absence of federal leadership: "the Federal Government has allowed the people. . . to follow their own course and build their own levees as they choose and where they choose until the action of the people of one State has thrown the waters back upon the people of another State, and vice versa." Moreover, as Congressman Robert Crosser of Ohio noted, the federal government's "levees only" policy--a "monumental blunder"--was not the right sort of federal guidance. (1482-83)
In passing the Flood Control Act of 1928, congressional members were influenced by Progressive Era objectives. Comprehensive planning and multiple-use management were hallmarks of the time. The goal was nothing less than a unified, planned society. In the early 1900s, many federal agencies, including the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Geological Survey, had agreed that each river must be treated as an integrated unit from source to mouth. Rivers were to be developed "systematically and consistently," with coordination of navigation, flood control, irrigation, and hydro-power. But the Corps of Engineers refused to join the movement toward watershed planning, instead preferring to conduct river management in a piecemeal fashion for the benefit of myriad local interests. (1484)
But perverse incentives were created by Federal flood policies in the 1920s that persist to the present:
Only a few decades after the 1927 flood, the Mississippi River rose up out of its banks once again, teaching a new lesson: federal structural responses plus disaster relief payouts had incentivized ever more daring incursions into the floodplain. The floodwater evaded federal efforts to control it with engineered structures, and those same structures prevented the river from finding its natural retention areas--wetlands, oxbows, and meanders--that had previously provided safe storage for floodwater. The resulting damage to affected areas was increased by orders of magnitude. The federal response to this lesson was the adoption of a nationwide flood insurance program intended to discourage unwise floodplain development and to limit the need for disaster relief. Both lessons are detailed in this section. (1486)
Paradoxically, navigational structures and floodplain constriction by levees, highway embankments, and development projects exacerbated the flood damage all along the rivers in 1951 and 1952. Flood-control engineering works not only enhanced the danger of floods, but actually contributed to higher flood losses. Flood losses were, in turn, used to justify more extensive control structures, creating a vicious cycle of ever-increasing flood losses and control structures. The mid-century floods demonstrated the need for additional risk-management measures. (1489)
Only five years after the program was enacted, Gilbert White's admonition was validated. Congress found that flood losses were continuing to increase due to the accelerating development of floodplains. Ironically, both federal flood control infrastructure and the availability of federal flood insurance were at fault. To address the problem, Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, which made federal assistance for construction in flood hazard areas, including loans from federally insured banks, contingent upon the purchase of flood insurance, which is only made available to participating communities. (1491)
But development and building in the floodplains of the rivers of the United States has continued and even accelerated since the 1990s.

Government policy comes into this set of disasters at several levels. First, climate policy -- the evidence has been clear for at least two decades that the human production of greenhouse gases is creating rapid climate change, including rising temperatures in atmosphere and oceans, severe storms, and rising ocean levels. A fundamental responsibility of government is to regulate and direct activities that create public harms, and the US government has failed abjectly to change the policy environment in ways that substantially reduce the production of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Second, as Klein and Zellmer document, the policies adopted by the US government in the early part of the twentieth century intended to prevent major flood disasters were ill conceived. The efforts by the US government and regional governments to control flooding through levees, reservoirs, dams, and other infrastructure interventions have failed, and have probably made the problems of flooding along major US rivers worse. Third, the human activities in flood plains -- residences, businesses, hotels and resorts -- have worsened the severity of the consequences of floods by elevating the cost in lives and property because of reckless development in flood zones. Governments have failed to discourage or prevent these forms of development, and the consequences have proven to be extreme (and worsening).

It is evident that storms, floods, and sea-level rise will be vastly more destructive in the decades to come. Here is a projection of the effects on the Florida coastline after a sustained period of sea-level rise resulting from a 2-degree Centigrade rise in global temperature (link):


We seem to have passed the point where it will be possible to avoid catastrophic warming. Our governments need to take strong actions now to ameliorate the severity of global warming, and to prepare us for the damage when it inevitably comes.

Kojève on freedom


An earlier post highlighted Alexandre Kojève's presentation of Hegel's rich conception of labor, freedom, and human self-creation. This account is contained in Kojève's analysis of the Master-Slave section of Hegel's Phenomenology in Kojève's Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the "Phenomenology of Spirit"; link.

Here are the key passages from Hegel's Phenomenology on which Kojève's account depends, from Terry Pinkard's translation in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit:

Hegel on the Master-Slave relation

195. However, the feeling of absolute power as such, and in the particularities of service, is only dissolution in itself, and, although the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom, in that fear consciousness is what it is that is for it itself , but it is not being-for-itself. However, through work, this servile consciousness comes round to itself. In the moment corresponding to desire in the master’s consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, as the thing there retained its self-sufficiency. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object, and, as a result, it has reserved to itself that unmixed feeling for its own self. However, for that reason, this satisfaction is itself only a vanishing, for it lacks the objective aspect, or stable existence. In contrast, work is desire held in check, it is vanishing staved off , or: work cultivates and educates. The negative relation to the object becomes the form of the object; it becomes something that endures because it is just for the laborer himself that the object has self-sufficiency. This negative mediating middle, this formative doing, is at the same time singularity, or the pure being-for-itself of consciousness, which in the work external to it now enters into the element of lasting. Thus, by those means, the working consciousness comes to an intuition of self-sufficient being as its own self.

196. However, what the formative activity means is not only that the serving consciousness as pure being-for-itself becomes, to itself, an exist- ing being within that formative activity. It also has the negative mean- ing of the first moment, that of fear. For in forming the thing, his own negativity, or his being-for-itself, only as a result becomes an object to himself in that he sublates the opposed existing form. However, this objective negative is precisely the alien essence before which he trembled, but now he destroys this alien negative and posits himself as such a negative within the element of continuance. He thereby becomes for himself an existing- being-for-itself . Being-for-itself in the master is to the servant an other, or it is only for him. In fear, being-for-itself is in its own self . In culturally formative activity, being-for-itself becomes for him his own being- for-itself, and he attains the consciousness that he himself is in and for himself. As a result, the form, by being posited as external, becomes to him not something other than himself, for his pure being-for-itself is that very form, which to him therein becomes the truth. Therefore, through this retrieval, he comes to acquire through himself a mind of his own, and he does this precisely in the work in which there had seemed to be only some outsider’s mind. – For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service, as well as the moments of culturally formative activity are both necessary, and both are necessary in a universal way. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear is mired in formality and does not diffuse itself over the conscious actuality of existence. Without culturally formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness will not become for it [consciousness] itself. If consciousness engages in formative activity without that first, absolute fear, then it has a mind of its own which is only vanity, for its form, or its negativity, is not negativity in itself , and his formative activity thus cannot to himself give him the consciousness of himself as consciousness of the essence. If he has not been tried and tested by absolute fear but only by a few anxieties, then the negative essence will have remained an externality to himself, and his substance will not have been infected all the way through by it. While not each and every one of the ways in which his natural consciousness was brought to fulfillment was shaken to the core, he is still attached in himself to determinate being. His having a mind of his own is then only stubbornness, a freedom that remains bogged down within the bounds of servility. To the servile consciousness, pure form can as little become the essence as can the pure form – when it is taken as extending itself beyond the singular individual – be a universal culturally formative activity, an absolute concept. Rather, the form is a skill which, while it has dominance over some things, has dominance over neither the universal power nor the entire objective essence. (Hegel, Phenomenology, 115-116)

Kojève's interpretation of Hegel

Here are the primary passages that represent the heart of Kojève's interpretation of this section.

Work, on the other hand, is repressed Desire, an arrested passing phase; or, in other words, it forms-and-educates. Work transforms the World and civilizes, educates, Man, the man who wants to work -- or who must work -- must repress the instinct that drives him "to consume" "immediately" the "raw" object. And the Slave can work for the Master -- that is, for another than himself -- only by repressing his own desires. Hence he transcends himself by working -- or perhaps better, he educates himself, he "cultivates" and "sublimates" his instincts by repressing them. On the other hand, he does not destroy the thing as it is given. He postpones the destruction of the thing by first transforming it through work; he prepares it for consumption -- that is to say, he "forms" it. In his work, he transforms things and transforms himself at the same time: he forms things and the World by transforming himself, by educating himself; and he educates himself, he forms himself, by transforming things and the World, Thus, the negative-or-negating relation to the object becomes a form of this object and gains permanence, precisely because, for the worker, the object has autonomy.... The product of work is the worker's production. It is the realization of his project, of his idea; hence, it is he that is realized in and by this product, and consequently he contemplates himself when he contemplates it.... Therefore, it is by work, and only by work, that man realizes himself objectively as man. Only after producing an artificial object is man himself really and objectively more than and different from a natural being; and only in this real and objective product does he become truly conscious of his subjective human reality. Kojève 24-25

The Master can never detach himself from the World in which he lives, and if this World perishes, he perishes with it. Only the Slave can transcend the given world (which is subjugated by the Master) and not perish. Only the Slave can transform the World that forms him and fixes him in slavery and create a World that he has formed in which he will be free. And the Slave achieves this only through forced and terrified work carried out in the Master's service. To be sure, this work by itself does not free him. But in transforming the World by this work, the Slave transforms himself too, and thus creates the new objective conditions that permit him to take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that he refused in the beginning for fear of death. And thus in the long run, all slavish work realizes not the Master's will, but the will -- at first unconscious -- of the Slave, who -- finally --succeeds where the Master -- necessarily -- fails. Therefore, it is indeed originally dependent, serving, and slavish Consciousness that in the end realizes and reveals the ideal of autonomous Self-Consciousness and is thus its "truth." Kojève 29-30

However, to understand the edifice of universal history and the process of its construction, one must know the materials that were used to construct it. These materials are men. To know what History is, one must therefore know what Man who realizes it is. Most certainly, man is something quite different from a brick. In the first place, if we want to compare universal history to the construction of an edifice, we must point out that men are not only the bricks that are used in the construction; they are also the masons who build it and the architects who conceive the plan for it, a plan, moreover, which is progressively elaborated during the construction itself. Furthermore, even as "brick," man is essentially different from a material brick: even the human brick changes during the construction, just as the human mason and the human architect do. Nevertheless, there is something in Man, in every man, that makes him suited to participate--passively or actively--in the realization of universal history. At the beginning of this History, which ends finally in absolute Knowledge, there are, so to speak, the necessary and sufficient conditions. And Hegel studies these conditions in the first four chapters of the Phenomenology.

Finally, Man is not only the material, the builder, and the architect of the historical edifice.  He is also the one for whom this edifice is constructed: he lives in it, he sees and understands it, he describes and criticizes it. There is a whole category of men who do not actively participate in the historical construction and who are content to live in the constructed edifice and to talk about it. These men, who live somehow "above the battle," who are content to talk about things that they do not create by their Action, are Intellectuals who produce intellectuals' ideologies, which they take for philosophy (and pass off as such). Hegel describes and criticizes these ideologies in Chapter V. (32-33)

The central ideas here are --
  • Work transforms and educates the worker.
  • Work requires the delay of consumption.
  • Work transforms the world and the environment. 
  • The self-creation of the human being through work is essential to his or her reality as a human being.
  • By merely directing and commanding work, the master fails to engage in self-creation.
  • The master cannot be truly free.
  • Human beings create history through their creative labor.
  • Human beings create and transform themselves through labor.
  • History is human-centered. History is "subject" as well as "object".
  • Those who merely think and reflect upon history are sterile and contribute nothing to the course of history.
These comments add up to a substantive theory of the human being in the world -- one that emphasizes creativity, transformation, and self-creation. It stands in stark contrast to the liberal utilitarian view of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham of human nature as consumer and rational optimizer of a given set of choices; instead, on Kojève’s (and Hegel's) view, the human being becomes fully human through creative engagement with the natural world, through labor.

It is interesting to realize that Kojève was a philosopher, but he was not primarily an academic professor. Instead, he was a high-placed civil servant and statesman in the French state, a man whose thinking and actions were intended to create a new path for France. He is credited with being one of the early theorists of the European Union.

Kojève's account of labor and freedom is, of course, influenced by his own immersion in the writings of the early Marx; so the philosophy of labor, freedom, and self-creation articulated here is neither pure Hegel nor pure Marx. We might say that it is pure Kojève.

Jeff Love's biography of Kojève is also of interest, emphasizing the Russian roots of Kojève's thought; The Black Circle: A Life of Alexandre Kojève. Love confirms the importance of the richer theory of human freedom and self-realization that is offered in Kojève’s account, and notes a parallel with themes in nineteenth-century Russian literature.
Kojève’s critique of self-interest merits renewal in a day when consumer capitalism and the reign of self-interest are hardly in question, either implicitly or explicitly, and where the key precincts of critique have been hobbled by their own reliance on elements of the modern conception of the human being as the free historical individual that have not been sufficiently clarified. Kojève’s thought is thus anodyne: far from being “philosophically” mad or the learned jocularity of a jaded, extravagant genius, it expresses a probing inquiry into the nature of human being that returns us to questions that reach down to the roots of the free historical individual. Moreover, it extends a critique of self-interest deeply rooted in Russian thought, and Kojève does so, no doubt with trenchant irony, in the very capital of the modern bourgeoisie decried violently by Dostoevsky in his Winter Notes on Summer Impressions.
(Here is an interesting reflection on Kojève as philosopher by Stanley Rosen; link.)

Tuesday, September 3, 2019

The US Chemical Safety Board


The Federal agency responsible for investigating chemical and petrochemical accidents in the United States is the Chemical Safety Board (link). The mission of the Board is described in these terms:
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. Headquartered in Washington, DC, the agency’s board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
The CSB’s mission is to “drive chemical safety change through independent investigation to protect people and the environment.”
The CSB’s vision is “a nation safe from chemical disasters.”
The CSB conducts root cause investigations of chemical accidents at fixed industrial facilities. Root causes are usually deficiencies in safety management systems, but can be any factor that would have prevented the accident if that factor had not occurred. Other accident causes often involve equipment failures, human errors, unforeseen chemical reactions or other hazards. The agency does not issue fines or citations, but does make recommendations to plants, regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), industry organizations, and labor groups. Congress designed the CSB to be non-regulatory and independent of other agencies so that its investigations might, where appropriate, review the effectiveness of regulations and regulatory enforcement.
CSB was legislatively conceived in analogy with the National Transportation Safety Board, and its sole responsibility is to conduct investigations of major chemical accidents in the United States and report its findings to the public. It is not subordinate to OSHA or EPA, but it collaborates with those (and other) Federal agencies as appropriate (link). It has no enforcement powers; its sole function is to investigate, report, and recommend when serious chemical or petrochemical accidents have occurred.

One of its most important investigations concerned the March 23, 2005 Texas City BP refinery explosion. A massive explosion resulted in the deaths of 15 workers, injuries to over 170 workers, and substantial destruction of the refinery infrastructure. CSB conducted an extensive investigation into the “root causes” of the accident, and assigned substantial responsibility to BP’s corporate management of the facility. Here is the final report of that investigation (link), and here is a video prepared by CSB summarizing its main findings (link).

The key findings of the CSB report focus on the responsibility of BP management for the accident. Here is a summary of the CSB assessment of root causes:

The BP Texas City tragedy is an accident with organizational causes embedded in the refinery’s culture. The CSB investigation found that organizational causes linked the numerous safety system failures that extended beyond the ISOM unit. The organizational causes of the March 23, 2005, ISOM explosion are

  • BP Texas City lacked a reporting and learning culture. Reporting bad news was not encouraged, and often Texas City managers did not effectively investigate incidents or take appropriate corrective action.
  • BP Group lacked focus on controlling major hazard risk. BP management paid attention to, measured, and rewarded personal safety rather than process safety.
  • BP Group and Texas City managers provided ineffective leadership and oversight. BP management did not implement adequate safety oversight, provide needed human and economic resources, or consistently model adherence to safety rules and procedures.
  • BP Group and Texas City did not effectively evaluate the safety implications of major organizational, personnel, and policy changes.
Underlying almost all of these failures to manage this complex process with a priority on “process safety” rather than simply personal safety is a corporate mandate for cost reduction:
In late 2004, BP Group refining leadership ordered a 25 percent budget reduction “challenge” for 2005. The Texas City Business Unit Leader asked for more funds based on the conditions of the Texas City plant, but the Group refining managers did not, at first, agree to his request. Initial budget documents for 2005 reflect a proposed 25 percent cutback in capital expenditures, including on compliance, HSE, and capital expenditures needed to maintain safe plant operations.[208] The Texas City Business Unit Leader told the Group refining executives that the 25 percent cut was too deep, and argued for restoration of the HSE and maintenance-related capital to sustain existing assets in the 2005 budget. The Business Unit Leader was able to negotiate a restoration of less than half the 25 percent cut; however, he indicated that the news of the budget cut negatively affected workforce morale and the belief that the BP Group and Texas City managers were sincere about culture change. (176)
And what about corporate accountability? What did BP have to pay in recompense for its faulty management of the Texas City refinery and the subsequent damages to workers and local residents? The answer is, remarkably little. OSHA assessed a fine of $50.6 million for its violations of safety regulations (link, link), and it committed to spend at least $500M to take corrective steps within the plant to protect the safety of workers. This was a record fine at the time; and yet it might very well be seen by BP corporate executives as a modest cost of doing business in this industry. It does not seem to be of the magnitude that would lead to fundamental change of culture, action, and management within the company.

BP commissioned a major review of BP refinery safety in all five of its US-based refineries following release of the CSB report. This study became the Baker Panel REPORT OF THE BP U.S. REFINERIES INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW PANEL (JANUARY 2007) (link). The Baker Panel consisted of fully qualified experts on industrial and technological safety who were in a very good position to assess the safety management and culture of BP in its operations of its five US-based refineries. The Baker Panel was specifically directed to refrain from attempting to analyze responsibility for the Texas City disaster and to focus its efforts on assessing the safety culture and management direction that were currently to be found in BP's five refineries. Here are some central findings:
  • Based on its review, the Panel believes that BP has not provided effective process safety leadership and has not adequately established process safety as a core value across all its five U.S. refineries.
  • BP has not always ensured that it identified and provided the resources required for strong process safety performance at its U.S. refineries. Despite having numerous staff at different levels of the organization that support process safety, BP does not have a designated, high-ranking leader for process safety dedicated to its refining business.
  • The Panel also found that BP did not effectively incorporate process safety into management decision-making. BP tended to have a short-term focus, and its decentralized management system and entrepreneurial culture have delegated substantial discretion to U.S. refinery plant managers without clearly defining process safety expectations, responsibilities, or accountabilities.
  • BP has not instilled a common, unifying process safety culture among its U.S. refineries.
  • While all of BP’s U.S. refineries have active programs to analyze process hazards, the system as a whole does not ensure adequate identification and rigorous analysis of those hazards.
  • The Panel’s technical consultants and the Panel observed that BP does have internal standards and programs for managing process risks. However, the Panel’s examination found that BP’s corporate safety management system does not ensure timely compliance with internal process safety standards and programs at BP’s five U.S. refineries.
  • The Panel also found that BP’s corporate safety management system does not ensure timely implementation of external good engineering practices that support and could improve process safety performance at BP’s five U.S. refineries. (Summary of findings, xii-xiii)
These findings largely validate and support the critical assessment of BP's safety management practices in the CSB report.

It seems clear that an important part of the substantial improvement that has occurred in aviation safety in the past fifty years is the effective investigation and reporting provided by the NTSB. NTSB is an authoritative and respected bureau of experts whom the public trusts when it comes to discovering the causes of aviation disasters. The CSB has a much shorter institutional history -- it was created in 1990 -- but we need to ask a parallel question here as well: Does the CSB provide a strong lever for improving safety practices in the chemical and petrochemical industries through its accident investigations; or are industry actors largely free to continue their poor management practices indefinitely, safe in the realization that large chemical accidents are rare and the costs of occasional liability judgments are manageable?